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Financial Social Innovation to Engage the Economically Marginalized: 







New sources of finance within the label of ‘impact investing’ have emerged as 
mechanisms to promote entrepreneurship within marginalized communities. 
Different vehicles for impact investment have emerged over the years; 
however, our understanding around their emergence, configuration and 
adoption is limited. Hence, the main purpose in this research is to study the 
role of the contextual drivers and conditions that gave rise to a unique form of 
impact investment in India, a financial social innovation – Developmental 
Venture Capital (DVC). Through the lens of capital theories, insights from the 
case of India’s largest and oldest DVC firm along with three of its most 
prominent investees are presented. Findings highlight that the social 
entrepreneurs behind the case DVC wholly re-conceptualized silicon valley-
style venture capital financing to suit small brick and mortar investments in 
rural India, developed mechanisms for deploying funding frugally, and created 
partnerships of equals between themselves and their investees. Investee 
founders leveraged human and social capital throughout the social innovation 
process via deep immersion in the socio-cultural milieu of India. 
 









1.0 Introduction  
 
Social innovations are viewed as innovative solutions to pressing social 
problems that create employment, new industries and business models (Bhatt 
et al., 2016; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012; Phills et al., 2008; Alvord et al., 2004). 
A majority of social innovations are introduced by social entrepreneurs with 
capabilities and access to resources that traditional ventures find difficult to 
acquire. The literature is replete with examples of entrepreneurial change 
agents who transformed societies with new concepts (Mumford, 2002). The 
micro-credit concept introduced by Bangladesh’s Nobel Peace Prize winning 
social entrepreneur Prof. Mohammad Yunus has been classed as a social 
innovation. It enabled millions of poor to access funding for setting up 
microenterprises (Bernasek and Stanfield, 1997; Bornstein, 1996).  
 
There is wide spread recognition of the positive impact social innovations 
backed by social enterprises have on economic systems (Harding, 2004; Neck 
et al., 2009). However, initiatives are often constrained in terms of social, 
financial and human capital – particularly access to finance (Alvord et al., 
2004). A growing body of literature has examined new funding sources for 
social innovation and enterprises operating in marginalized communities. Such 
sources fall under the rubric of ‘impact investments’ but also called social 
investments, social finance, social impact investments, socially responsible 
investing, social impact bonds, development impact bonds, venture 
philanthropy and developmental venture capital (Höchstädter and Scheck, 
2015; Geobey et al., 2012; Moore et al., 2012a). There is considerable interest 
in this area and a growing range of actors are becoming involved to form an 
ecosystem of social ventures, intermediaries and investors – all committed to 
addressing social needs (OECD, 2015).  
 
A review of research in the area highlights that most papers discuss western or 
developed country-based impact investment models, methods and cases. 
Research on impact investment and its interplay with social innovation and 
enterprise in developing countries is scarce. Scholars acknowledge that 
patterns, norms and drivers of social innovation and entrepreneurship in the 
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developing world differs from the developed world (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015) 
and there is a need for more comparative research to expand our 
understanding of social innovation in different national settings (Chell et al., 
2010). From the viewpoint of developing countries, where extreme socio-
economic inequalities exist, there is little knowledge on the emergence of 
different forms of impact investment mechanisms. The role of cultural norms, 
religion and social hierarchy often have a powerful influence on dictating 
patterns of daily life in developing countries, including enterprise start-up and 
doing business. Further, attitudinal inadequacies such as risk aversion, 
passivity and over-reliance on the public sector have also been reported 
(Kasabov, 2016). A careful consideration of these aspects is then needed 
when trying to understand the role of impact investment in the mobilization of 
social innovations in developing countries.  
 
The empirical setting chosen for this research is India, a developing country 
where societal problems arising out of extreme poverty, corruption violence, 
illiteracy and lack of access to basic facilities are greatly pronounced (Heston 
and Kumar, 2008; Lingaraj and Kumar, 1983). Despite a number of useful 
initiatives led by the government and multi-lateral funding agencies, a serious 
gap in financing for social innovation and entrepreneurship exists (Sonne, 
2012). Hence, a demand-side pull effect has resulted, leading to the 
emergence of numerous ingenuitive financing mechanisms (Sonne, 2012; Mair 
& Marti, 2006; Nicholls & Cho, 2006) such as developmental venture capital 
(DVC) – an impact investment vehicle.  
 
This research builds on McKeever et al’s., (2014) work. They suggest that 
social capital enables and encourages entrepreneurs to share entrepreneurial 
expertise. Sharing of entrepreneurial expertise between the funding body and 
recipients and amongst the funded social enterprises forms the basis of DVC – 
the focal impact investment vehicle in this research. A theoretical advance is 
made by incorporating human and financial capital with the social capital body-
of-knowledge, to explore the conditions that led to the emergence of a world-
class DVC fund in India. The research highlights the role of human, social and 
financial capital in the development of social innovations and enterprises 
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funded by the focal DVC. Analytical contributions are based on an in-depth 
case study of a DVC fund - Aavishkaar, based in Mumbai, India and three of its 
investees. Aavishkaar is one of the world’s first DVC funds and as per their 
2016 Impact report US$201 million worth of investments in social enterprises 
developing social innovations across 8 sectors were made. Such investments 
had an estimated 56,086,800 beneficiaries in rural and semi-urban India. 
Aavishkar investments to-date have resulted in the creation of 35,000 jobs and 
in the last two years, and US$49.1 million in income has been generated for 
marginalized households (Aavishkaar, 2016).  
 
An exploratory case study approach informs the methodological framework. 
Accounts from the DVC’s management and social entrepreneurs funded are 
analysed; these provide the contextual detail to highlight the manner in which 
different forms of capital (financial, social and human) contributed to the 
development and scaling of social innovations by DVC funded social 
enterprises in India. 
 
The paper is structured as follows; first, we discuss current debates on social 
innovation, capital enablers and constraints in social entrepreneurship and 
impact investment mechanisms as an alternate source of finance. The 
research methodology is presented next followed by prominent themes that 
resulted from the data analysis. In the discussion, two major contributions of 
the research are highlighted and finally the conclusion presents implications of 




2.0 Background Literature 
 
2.1 The Social Innovation Process 
 
The social innovation view places emphasis on the social entrepreneur as 
change agents altering systems for the provision of public goods and services 
(Nicholls, 2010a). Such activity requires effort and the channelling of financial 
resources towards ambiguous scenarios, making traditional return on 
investment (RoI) calculations difficult to compute. Ambiguity around RoI often 
impedes social entrepreneurs from accessing traditional sources of funding 
such as venture capital (Lumpkin et al. 2013; Nicholls 2010b). Instead they 
need to garner support from a range of stakeholders outside traditional 
financial institutions (Austin et al., 2006; Nicholls and Cho, 2006).  
 
Social innovations are shaped and influenced by historical, cultural and 
organisational contexts (Newth & Woods, 2014; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; 
Desa and Basu, 2013). They may be resisted and refined by contextual forces 
and the expectations of various stakeholders (Newth and Woods, 2014). The 
social innovation process is often triggered by ‘problem identification’ which is 
based on the unique life experiences of creative social entrepreneurs 
(Mumford, 2002; Policastro and Gardner, 1999). The conjectured solution to 
the ‘problem’, usually a social need or a novel concept, is often incomplete. 
Given the complexity of social settings, this spurs further technical and social 
development. Eventually making the process long drawn, dynamic and iterative 
(Mumford, 2002). 
 
From a process standpoint, there are a few useful parallels between 
commercial innovation and social innovation. Van de Ven et al.’s (2008) work 
on innovation in commercial settings highlights that the innovation process 
consists of three phases: initiation, development and implementation. In the 
social entrepreneurship literature, scholars commonly use the term scaling to 
refer to implementation (example: Austin et al., 2006; Guclu et al., 2002). 
This is because it is common practice in social enterprises to adopt inorganic 
growth strategies to diffuse (or implement) a new idea through collaborations 
and alliances. Unlike conventional entrepreneurs, the social entrepreneur is 
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driven by motives to create some form of social value (Austin et al., 2006; 
Chell et al., 2010) and that a particular segment of society (end users) can be 
identified as target beneficiaries of the innovation (Tan et al., 2005).  
 
Considering the implications of the above, it is suggested that Van de Ven et 
al.’s (2008) three phases of the commercial innovation process: initiation, 
development and implementation, if modified to: initiation, development and 
scaling – would come to represent the social innovation process.  To 
elaborate, during the ‘initiation’ period, a solution for an unmet social need is 
conjectured by the social entrepreneur through experimentation and 
refinement of ideas (Corner and Ho, 2010). The ‘developmental’ period 
involves activities that help crystallise this novel idea, such as creating a 
social mission, registering a new venture, mobilising resources (Guclu et al., 
2002). Finally, during the ‘scaling’ period, the new idea is diffused through 
expansion or collaboration (Austin et al., 2006).  
 
Through the process of innovative resource combinations, the social 
entrepreneur transforms existing resources (different forms of capital) into 
value, both economic and social (Dorado, 2006). The next section outlines 
how different forms of capital constrain or enable the development of social 
innovations.  
 
2.2 Capital Enablers and Constraints of Social Entrepreneurship 
 
Lehner (2014) suggests that when new social enterprises attempt to acquire 
and/or generate different forms of capital, the often-reliable enterprise start-up 
stages of opportunity recognition, formation and exploitation, cannot be easily 
distinguished as separate processes. The informal exchange of ideas between 
the funders and the entrepreneur leads to the formation of norm-value pairs. 
This then facilitates the transformation of the acquired and/or generated forms 
of capital into economic value. To undertake such exchange requires social 
entrepreneurial passion from the focal entrepreneur, which is characteristically 
unique in that it is characterised by enthusiasm and excitement and a desire to 
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make a mark (Yitshaki and Kropp, 2016). Hence, a central focus is placed on 
the social entrepreneur, the change enacting agent. The social entrepreneur 
innovates, transforms and combines existing resources (different forms of 
capital) into value, both economic and social (Dorado, 2006). Each new 
resource combination can consist of three forms of capital: financial, human 
and social. These forms of capital have a prominent role in the social 
innovation process. Discussed below are the roles of human, social and 
financial capital in the social innovation process enacted by social 
entrepreneurs. 
 
2.2.1 Human capital 
  
The human capital of the founder entrepreneur(s) is regarded as a key input in 
entrepreneurial innovation (Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 2000; Westhead & 
Cowling, 1995). Studies conducted in commercial enterprises suggest that a 
high level of human capital is associated with high levels of innovation output. 
(Pittaway et al., 2004; Bianchi, 2001). In the case of social enterprises, the 
human capital of the founder social entrepreneur is considered crucial for the 
initiation and development of social innovations. Scholars have long argued 
that social entrepreneurs are innovators with exceptional creativity and 
leadership skills (Prabhu, 1999; Zahra et al., 2009). Therefore, they are able to 
use unique cognitive processes and leadership expertise to identify social 
restrictions on potential solutions. Further, they are also able to analyse 
downstream consequences of social implementation as they generate, revise 
and develop new ideas. 
 
Education prestige and prior management experience of the founder social 
entrepreneur are seen as a positive influence on venture performance (Miller 
and Wesley, 2010). This is because application of business knowledge and 
skills (Dees, 1998; Leadbeater, 1997) and strategic use of resources (Mair and 
Marti, 2006; Dees, 1998) is critical when providing solutions to societal 
problems through social entrepreneurial initiatives. Thus, entrepreneurs with 
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strong performance measurement projections (that are part of the business 
plan) are able to garner more support from funders (Mair and Marti, 2006).   
 
The development and scaling of a social innovation requires strategic 
investment in human capital within a social enterprise (Kong, 2007). However, 
recruiting individuals with desirable skills and knowledge (or high levels of 
human capital) is expensive and social enterprises are rarely able to pay 
market-rate compensation (Oster, 1995). Then, there is reliance on volunteers 
to fill key functions such as board members, fundraisers or as staff to deliver 
services on the ground (Dorado, 2006). This creates challenges for the social 
enterprise’s management when looking to encourage innovative behaviour. 
 
2.2.2 Social capital  
 
Social capital comprises the bonds, bridges and linkages that hold together 
societal members (Richards and Reed, 2015). In this manner, social capital is 
more important than both financial and human capital, because social 
relationships constitute a form of capital that may be transformed into other 
forms of capital. In fact, the creation of social capital is one of the key goals of 
social entrepreneurship. The created social capital brings innovation to social 
settings, especially in resource constrained environments of inner cities and 
developing countries (Dufays and Huybrechts, 2014). 
 
A community’s social capital is also a key resource that social entrepreneurs 
can deploy in the new venture creation process (Haugh, 2007; Thompson, 
2002). Successful social entrepreneurs use their social networks to initiate 
social change and galvanise support for their mission (Alvord et al., 2004). For 
instance, Alvord et al., (2004) found that social enterprises tend to heavily rely 
on pre-existing community assets (community’s social capital) in the 
development of core innovations. The use of the community’s social assets 
means that relatively small investments (financial capital) could be used to 
bring about large-scale changes.  
 
McKeever et al. (2014) suggested that research on social capital has mainly 
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focused on the measurement of the structural, relational and cognitive 
dimensions of the concept. Measurements, though useful, are unfortunately 
unable to explain how social capital, as a relational artefact and connecting 
mechanism, actually works in practice. To understand social entrepreneurship 
through the lens of social capital, it would be important to study the 
phenomenon as socially situated and influenced practice. The context then, 
within which entrepreneurs are embedded, must become a central focus of 
research.  
 
2.2.3 Financial Capital 
  
Social entrepreneurs involved in the initiation and development of social 
innovations recurrently report a lack of finance (Moore et al., 2012a & 2012b). 
In general, mainstream financial institutions are reluctant to finance start up 
social enterprises owing to the heightened risks associated with assessing 
both social and economic potential (Austin et al., 2006). New funding sources 
such as impact investments, venture philanthropy or developmental venture 
capital are few in number and fund ventures aligned to their objectives only 
(Hockerts, 2006; Pepin, 2005).  
 
Given the above limitations, in the initiation phase of the social innovation 
process, the social entrepreneur requires unusual creativity in generating 
finance (Mumford, 2002). Research in this area suggests that social ventures 
often deploy innovative financing strategies such as ‘bricolage’ (Desa & Basu, 
2013) or ‘making do by applying combinations of resources at hand’ (Baker 
and Nelson, 2005. pg. 33). In a developing country like India, it would be 
reasonable to assume that innovative modes of financing would be needed 
much more than developed countries as social enterprises face environments 
that are resource scarce (Collier, 2007; Seelos and Mair, 2005; Zahra et al., 
2009) or where financial institutions are either entirely absent or very weak 
(Kistruck et al., 2010; Mair and Marti, 2009).  
A final element to consider is the impact of financier expectations on particular 
social enterprises’ strategy. According to Achleitner et al. (2014), the multi-
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dimensional return requirements of social enterprise financiers could lead to a 
concentration of the funding structure. This may trigger a change of the social 
enterprise’s business strategy to better reflect the expectations and interests of 
the financiers. Hence, finding financing that does not require such alterations 
remains challenging for social entrepreneurs.  
2.3 Role of Impact Investing in Financing Social Innovations 
 
It has been widely reported that mainstream financial institutions tend to 
marginalize social entrepreneurs and beneficiaries of social innovations. This is 
due to perceptions of higher risks associated with returns on social investment 
(Moore et al., 2012a and b). In comparison, high-growth new ventures in 
commercial settings developing technological innovations have much better 
levels of access to equity financing from venture capitalists and other financiers 
(Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009).  
 
The persisting financing gap for social enterprises is slowly being remedied by 
the rapidly developing ‘impact investing’ community. Impact investments 
intentionally target ventures that have a specific social and/or environmental 
objective along with a business model that can generate financial returns 
(OECD, 2015; G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014; Moore et al., 
2012 a & b). The sector is quite diversified with a range of prevalent models 
(Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Cohen and Sahlman, 2013). An emphasis is 
placed on non-financial impact - which must not be merely intentional (Brown 
and Swersky 2012, pg. 3) and ‘measurable’ (O’Donohoe et al., 2010). There 
appears to be no limitation regarding types of mechanisms or instruments 
available for impact Investing. It occurs across various asset classes including 
debt, equity, guarantees and deposits, and newer structures such as social 
impact bonds (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; O’Donohoe et al., 2010).  
 
Impact financing’s boundaries overlap with the broad and more established 
field of ‘Social Return on Investment’ (SRI); and on a general level, their 
definitions do not differ drastically. SRI is often defined as the integration of 
certain non-financial concerns, such as ethical, social or environmental, into 
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the investment process (Sandberg et al., 2009). This would be similar to impact 
investment - which involves the provision of financial resources for a return 
with an aim to generate a social and environmental impact (GIIN 2013; Louche 
et al., 2012). Impact investing can, therefore, be considered an SRI strategy 
but with two differences. First, the ‘nature and size of investments’ – while SRI 
funds would traditionally focus on large corporations (Chua et al., 2011), a 
typical impact investment structure would target small enterprises (Fleming, 
2012). The second difference is the ‘expected level of financial return’ - SRI 
investors would expect near commercial returns, impact investors on the other 
hand aim for a low financial return to offset inflation effects (Ashta, 2012).  
 
According to Höchstädter & Scheck (2015), the one area where there is a 
distinct lack of conceptual clarity relates to the characteristics required of an 
impact investee. Should impact investees be only ‘social sector organizations’ 
or any corporation that defines its mission in social or environmental terms? 
Are social projects of entirely commercial companies suitable for impact 
investment? Thus, whether a financial product should be considered an impact 
investment or not would be largely subjective and lacking in empirical value 
(Benijts, 2010).  
 
2.4 Developmental Venture Capital as an Impact Investment Vehicle 
 
An up and coming vehicle to deliver impact investment, developmental venture 
capital (DVC), has started to gain the attention of policy makers and 
researchers alike (SIIT, 2014). An example would be the Acumen Fund that 
aims to solve problems of global poverty through equity investments in India, 
Pakistan and Africa (Acumen, 2015).  
 
DVCs and traditional venture capital have a number of important differences 
(Höchstädter and Scheck 2015). DVCs’ work is more complex as social 
dimensions need to be valued. Further, transaction costs are higher due to 
fragmented demand and supply and the complexity of deal structuring (SIIT, 
2014; Geobey et al., 2012). DVCs specifically finance social enterprises 
aligned to their social objectives (Hockerts, 2006), and invest in sectors 
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ranging from healthcare to environmental start-ups. Average investments 
range between $1 Million in the USA (Miller and Wesley, 2010) and Euro 1 
million in Europe (Randjelovic et al., 2003). These investments are generally 
medium term, lasting 3 to 5 years with fewer exit opportunities in comparison to 
mainstream VC investments (Miller and Wesley, 2010).  
 
DVCs, however, do share a number of similarities with their commercial 
counterparts. Social entrepreneurs can access equity finance in the early 
stages of a venture in exchange for involvement of the DVC in its operations 
(Pepin, 2005). DVCs provide value addition in the form of non-financial support 
such as consultancy and access to networks to support social ventures 
(Ingstad et al., 2014). Like VCs, DVCs seek ventures with high growth 
prospects, demanding economic returns between 21-35% for their investments 
(Miller and Wesley, 2010).  
 
DVCs encounter unique challenges in funding and supporting social 
enterprises; from deal sourcing, relationship building, screening and 
information gathering, co-creation, early decision-making, circular reasoning, 
deal structuring, post-investment after care, disengagement and return 
(Gordon, 2014). There is limited deal flow and their funding decisions are more 
complex given the dual identity of social ventures (Sonne, 2012; Pepin, 2005).  
 
If Höchstädter and Scheck’s (2015) arguments are considered, then labelling 
DVC as an impact investment vehicle would be a matter of normative 
judgment. In other words, the ‘social’ in DVCs’ investment decisions would 
need to be judged and as to who ought to be eligible for investment (Santos, 
2012). It is suggested that a more fruitful direction for further research would be 
to consider the practical perspective; specifically, the specific manner in which 




3.0 Methodology  
 
 
The aim in this research is to explore the role of human, social and financial 
capital in the development of social innovations and social enterprises funded 
by DVCs. Considering this aim an exploratory research strategy was adopted 
within a qualitative cast study research design. An interpretivist basis is 
appropriate as it recognizes that research is value laden and relies on the 
subjective experiences, beliefs and values of the individuals involved (Darke et 
al., 1998; Robson, 2002). The diversity in experiences is especially relevant for 
investigating the topics of social innovation and social enterprises as such 
phenomena are characterized by multiple stakeholder involvement (Dorado, 
2006; Austin et al., 2006).  
 
The choice of deploying an exploratory case study was based on three 
reasons: first, it is preferred for research in areas where theory is in its early 
and formative stages (Eisenhardt, 1989; Benbasat et al., 1987; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007) as is true for the areas of social innovation, social enterprises 
and DVCs. Second, it would enable the examination of a social phenomenon, 
in its natural and everyday context and through the views of multiple 
stakeholders (Yin, 1981a, 1981b; Feagin et al., 1991). Third, multiple data 
sources can be usefully integrated such as semi-structured interviews and 
observations alongside secondary data (Yin, 2003). This makes the 
exploratory case study attractive for small sample studies, such as this 
research, where the complexity of the unit is studied intensively.  
 
Fieldwork took place in India at Aavishkaar – a DVC based in Mumbai, India. 
Aavishkaar represented an exemplar DVC whose founder was awarded the 
Ashoka Fellowship for innovativeness by the global social venture network - 
Ashoka (Ashoka, 2015). On receipt of consent, the founder as organisational 
gatekeeper, provided a list of potential investee participants. Sub-case 
selection was informed by theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). As a result, three sub-cases of social enterprises were selected which 
provided useful illustrations of the type of social enterprises and innovations 
Aavishkar funded. The chosen cases were vetted by the founder as 
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representing diverse sectors and at different stages in the funding cycle. These 
included SKEPL (dairy sector), Rangasutra (Handicrafts) and Swas 
Healthcare.  
 
SKEPL was selected as it represented a well developed rural innovation that 
had received funding from Aavishkaar in 2003 and by 2009 was a successful 
social enterprise founded by an entrepreneurial team (SKEPL 2015). 
Rangasutra was selected as it was in the growth stage and represented an 
exemplar in the handicrafts sector. It had received funding in 2007, its founder 
was a female and by 2009 it supported over 1000 rural artisans in remote 
areas of India (Rangasutra, 2015). Finally, Swas Healthcare, which was in its 
initial developmental stage, received funding from Aavishkaar in 2009 which it 
used to setup a chain of naturopathy clinics across Gujarat, Rajkot, Surat and 
Baroda (SWAS, 2015).  
 
The primary data source consisted of 10 in depth semi-structured interviews 
with members of Aavishkaar’s management team as well as with the investee 
social entrepreneurs. The interviews lasted between 1 to 1.5 hours, were tape 
recorded and transcribed. An overview of participating interviewees is 
presented in Table 1 below.  
 
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE - 
 
A variety of documents were also analyzed throughout the research process. 
These included customer or investor surveys, newspaper articles, corporate 
videos, published teaching case studies, practitioner reports, leaflets, 
brochures, in house newsletters and annual financial reports. Whenever 
possible, direct observations were used to supplement and triangulate 
interview data. The first author observed a number of meetings between 
managers, which gave good insight into the decision making practices at the 
organization. Observations were primarily aimed at providing further contextual 
information for the semi-structured interviews.  
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Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) suggest that theory building from qualitative 
research is an inductive process. The focus was to extract meaning from 
complex qualitative data emerging from the 10 in-depth interviews. This was 
done through the development of summary themes, patterns or categories 
from raw data through a process of data reduction. Here the qualitative data 
analysis rules recommended by Miles & Huberman (1994) were followed. 
These authors point out that careful descriptions of events, people and settings 
is one of the most important contributions of qualitative research. This requires 
an interpretive and analytic effort to illuminate the constant, influential and 
determining events which shape the course of events. Hence, data analysis 
was a formalized yet creative process (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Hence, 
interview data was analyzed to discover the manner in which human, financial 
and social capitals were accumulated and deployed for the creation and growth 
of subject social enterprises. Emanating findings helped in tracing the evolution 
of the social innovation process deployed by each sub-case organization. 
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4.0 Findings  
 
Findings from the research are discussed under the following themes in line 
with the capital theories-based framework adopted in this research.  
 
4.1 The Important Role of the Founder’s Human Capital  
 
Vineet, Aavishkaar’s founder worked previously as the CEO of a Gujarat 
Government initiative in India: Gujarat Grassroots Innovation Augmentation 
Network (GIAN), which funded traditional knowledge innovations. GIAN’s 
mission was deeply rooted in South Asia’s cultural heritage. They funded novel 
solutions based on ‘traditional’ heritage-based knowledge of India’s diverse 
multicultural rural and grassroots communities. Such knowledge includes 
artisan skills like embroidery for women and carpentry or blacksmith for men, 
as well as traditional farming methods. In 1999, when GIAN made its first 
investment, Vineet discovered that high growth rural enterprises were 
financially excluded when compared to high growth technology based firms in 
urban India. Vineet explains how he discovered the market gap:   
 
“While working for GIAN, I interacted with several entrepreneurs in rural Gujarat. The 
interaction made me realize that most rural enterprises with innovative ideas and 
potential for rapid growth lacked access to risk capital.”  
 
Over time, Vineet realised that the institutional boundaries of GIAN were stifling 
and that there was a social entrepreneurial opportunity to provide equity 
finance to high growth rural enterprises. He believed that such a provision 
would be similar to that of Venture Capitalists funding high growth 
technological ventures. He left GIAN and began setting up the new venture:  
 
“I left GIAN and short listed eight high potential rural enterprises that required 
additional capital. I then began searching for investors to back my idea by setting up a 
venture capital fund exclusively for such ventures.”  
 
However, at the time, the commercial venture capital Industry in India was itself 
just emerging and the total investments by them in high-technology firms stood 
at a meagre $320 million (Nageswaran, 2003). Given the enormous size of the 
Indian ICT sector as well as other high growth technology based sectors like 
automotive parts and biotech, the spread of VC investment was quite thin. 
 17 
However, Vineet was determined to bring to a new approach to rural finance in 
India, borrowing methods from traditional VC finance learnt from work 
experience prior to GIAN, and utilizing his training as an MBA and connections 
within investor networks. Vineet created a unique combination of ideas, 
resources, methods and technology to solve a pressing social problem with an 
innovative new business model.  
 
The founders of the three investee sub-cases also experienced failed 
government initiatives for poverty alleviation and development. The founder of 
SKEPL, an accountant, witnessed severe inefficiencies and crippling corruption 
at producer cooperatives - a development initiative to tackle rural poverty which 
did not work in the complex socio-cultural context of India with powerful 
institutions such as organized religion and the system (Singh, 2012; Bennett, 
1983). Rangasutra was founded by a social worker with prior experience in 
development initiatives of international NGOs. The founder questioned the 
efficacy of these projects in empowering marginalised communities which built 
a culture of dependency. The founders of Swas healthcare realised that 
healthcare provision in smaller towns and cities of India was wholly inadequate 
as government hospitals were ill equipped and poorly managed.  
 
Founders’ human capital played an important role in the start-up cycles of the 
three sub-cases. The founding team of SKEPL consisted of seven 
professionals - mostly urban residents with industry specific human capital 
ranging from accounting, IT to marketing. They conceptualised the need for an 
information management systems dubbed AMCS in the early 1990s for milk 
cooperatives in India. Ujval, one of the founders, with decades of work 
experience in sales and distribution recalls the ideation phase of the concept:   
 
“I had gone to a village for a few days for my friend’s marriage in the summer. On my 
daily morning walks, I noticed long winding queues of farmers and their families with 
large canisters of milk outside a local dairy which was just a basic shed.  It was hot 
and humid and there was quite a commotion as the queue moved slowly down the 
dusty road …. I could see that some officials were measuring the milk using scales, 
others taking samples and some handing out plastic or paper tokens to the farmers 
after the milk collection…”.  
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The system intended to introduce transparency between milk cooperatives’ 
officials and rural semi-literate farmers. It would also enhance efficiency 
through seamless computerised operations. SKEPL’s founders used their 
background, training and skillset to develop AMCS; integrating electronic 
weighing of milk with Quality testing equipment. Successful installation of 
AMCS at milk cooperatives required customisation and the founders’ 
backgrounds and cultural understanding was essential for achieving this. 
Customization included developing content in local languages to cater to end 
users’ multilingual requirements. Further, the system’s design was greatly 
simplified considering the significant gaps in digital literacy of semi-literate 
farmers.  
 
The cases of the founders of the second and third investees, Rangasutra and 
SWAS Healthcare, echoed Vineet’s experience. In both instances, founders 
Sumita and Sanjay of Rangasutra and SWAS Healthcare respectively, 
conceived solutions for problems that poor and marginalized rural communities 
faced based on prior fieldwork and an extended immersion in the communities’ 
lives. Sumita explains:         
 
I had worked as a social worker for the past twenty years and I realised that the NGOs 
were unable to empower their target communities. I felt that they were building a 
culture of dependency by providing donations or grants. I strongly felt that there would 
be a better way of doing things and after talking to community representatives I 
realised that this could not lead to economic development of the locals. I intuitively felt 
that people needed to develop faith in their ability or skills to invest in their own future”.  
 
Sumita’s desire to help rural artisans combined with her human capital led to 
the launch of Rangasutra, a company whose mission is to empower artisans in 
rural communities. She explains how her long engagement with rural women 
and men made her recognise that their human capital (craftsmanship) had 
been passed from generation to generation:  
 
“I saw that women artisans had skills their traditional crafts heritage such as intricate 
embroideries, applique work, weaving as well as tie and dyeing cloth using natural 
plan based dyes. These artisans belonged to rural communities and some of them had 




Sanjay, the founder of SWAS Healthcare, explained the manner in which he 
designed his venture. He aligned his “solution” with not only the healthcare 
requirements of poor rural communities where spending power is very low but 
also to culturally valued and sacred practices in rural India: 
  
“In India healthcare provision in smaller cities and towns is quite limited…and 
government clinics and hospitals are quite ill equipped. ……Then,…long term health 
issues like diabetes, depression and so on are on the rise. Allopathy is not well suited 
for treatment of these chronic health conditions due to availability of proper advice and 
affordability. So we thought about ancient Indian treatments of Ayurveda and Yoga 
that could be affordable and suitable…”  
 
A final notable point relates to levels of entrepreneurial activity within certain 
ethnic communities. Both SKEPL (in 2003) and Swas Healthcare (in 2010) 
were founded in the Western state of Gujarat in India. Entrepreneurship is 
deeply rooted in the social structure and cultural DNA of the Gujarati 
community and its business diaspora are present across the world from Hong 
Kong to USA. It is suggested that being a part of this ethnic community 
awarded Ujval and Sanjay with specific human capital that proved useful when 
starting enterprises within the socio-cultural milieu and norms of doing 
business in Gujarat. 
 
4.2 Using Social Bricolage to Overcome Resource Constraints 
 
The ability of Aavishkaar to tap into vast reserves of all the different forms of 
capital available with overseas Indian technocrats in Bangalore was a 
significant marker in their start-up success. A large number of these 
technocrats became business angels in Silicon Valley, developing extensive 
knowledge and innovation networks with academics and other supporting 
institutions such as venture capitalists. Towards the end of the 1990s, large 
numbers of them returned to India, seeking opportunities during the Y2K 
crises. Most of these technocrats chose to settle in Bangalore. The 
combination of available expertise, different forms of capital, network hubs 
such as the Indian Institute of Science and Indian Institute of Management, and 
favourable socio-economic conditions led to Bangalore becoming the Silicon 
Valley of India. Consequently, most of the commercial venture capitalists at the 
time were also geographically concentrated in Bangalore.  
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In the late 1990s, VC firms in India were making deals of a minimum size of $1 
million. Whereas, high growth rural enterprises needed financing in the region 
of $30,000 - $50,000 only. Their requirements could also not be met by the 
emerging Indian Microfinance sector. Microfinance catered to a maximum loan 
size of $10 - $15,000. Hence, what was needed was a mid-range financial 
provision and this was the niche Vineet identified for a new concept - micro-
venture capital for rural enterprises. However, the timing was not right and 
Vineet had no prior entrepreneurial experience and so began his long arduous 
entrepreneurial journey of developing networks and convincing Bangalore-
based overseas Indian technocrats to invest in his concept. He reflects:  
 
“I had no money, no entrepreneurial experience and had never worked in the VC 
industry. I was also not well connected and being a young graduate, I faced major 
challenges. I struggled for five years without any salary. I continued to work hard. I 
guess my persistence made people start believing in me…..In the initial years we 
made little progress. It was an uphill task. It is right to say that Aavishkaar is born out 
of sweat and blood – a lot of hardship.”  
 
All three founders of the investee social enterprises deployed social bricolage. 
Bricolage describes a particular way of acting as ‘doing things with whatever is 
at hand’ (Levi-Strauss 1967: 17). Bricolage has been used to characterize 
organizational practices related to improvisation in an entrepreneurial setting. 
In the face of resource-constraints, entrepreneurial activity relies on bricolage 
in the social construction of resource environments, and in the rejection of 
institutional constraints (Baker and Nelson 2005).  
 
To illustrate, the founder of SKEPL explained that it operated under the brand 
name of AkashgangaTM. The brand name Akashganga in most Indian 
languages stands for the ‘milky way’, a name quite apt given that SKEPL’s 
registered office in Vidya Nagar lies on the outskirts of Anand, India’s milk city. 
This city is globally recognised as the centre of India’s white revolution 
(wherein white refers to India’s dairy revolution post-independence). The dairy 
industry in India is largely organised in the form of milk cooperatives. Member 
farmers with their small, family based holdings reside in villages outside urban 
locations. The cooperatives collect milk from their member farmers every day. 
After quality checks, the collected milk is pasteurised and packaged in the 
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cooperative’s factories. This milk is then sold through an extensive distribution 
network onto retailers in cities. The cooperative distributes the sales proceeds 
to the farmers as per standardised rates and after deductions.  
 
The founder of SKEPL used social bricolage and accessed the knowledge and 
social networks of the dairy co-operatives for ideation, development and the 
scaling their concept. This would not have been possible without a deep and 
extended immersion in the life-world of milk production in India. Ujval explains 
in the quote below: 
  
“We wanted to understand the operations and how the Indian dairy industry was 
formed…we met with dairy officials and farmers over a long period of time….slowly 
their feedback helped us to trial and modify hardware and develop new software…it 
was slow and we did it ourselves”     
 
Like SKEPL, Sumita of Rangasutra also used social bricolage and built 
networks to organise rural artisans and form a workers cooperative.  She set 
up Rangasutra with a mission to empower artisan communities. Skills training 
was provided through collaboration with educational institutions like the 
Handloom School, Maheshwar and the Miller Centre for Social Entrepreneurs. 
Sumita explains the business model of Rangasutra below:  
 
“We have a centralised marketing team of designers and marketers in our Mehrauli 
office in New Delhi. They combine traditional skills of these artisans with contemporary 
designs producing apparel, soft furnishings and so on ….. The central team 
coordinates and supervises the production, interacting with the producer groups and 
our suppliers and our retailers….Rangasutra is a registered workers cooperative and 
artisans are represented on the board, attend our annual general meetings-we 
currently have over 1000 members”    
 
Over seventy percent of Rangasutra’s artisan owner-workers are women and 
self-employment has empowered them economically and within their family 
units. They now send their daughters to school and motivate other women to 
join the cooperative. Following equity investments by Aavishkaar in 2007, 
Rangasutra has received funding from EXIM bank of India-the exporters’ bank, 
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Thus, a network of financial 
institutions fund these self-help groups. Products of Rangasutra are marketed 
through large retailers like the International brand IKEA and the Indian 
FabIndia.  
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A notable role is played by Aavishkaar in building social capital within their 
investee teams. Lindsay explained how external social capital is built by 
providing client social entrepreneurs with regular newsletters and through 
social media:   
 
“We have conducted an event in Africa. We have started a Wiki page for the company 
to document the work of our team this information is accessible to everyone. We have 
grown to 3000 subscribers in three months…”    
 
Lindsay described the manner in which entrepreneurial behaviour through 
team working and cross collaboration was encouraged within Aavishkaar and 
its investees:  
 
“I encourage and motivate staff to work in teams…For example recently one of our 
associates, Sanjay came up with the idea for a special supplement of the best articles 
of 2008. We conduct weekly team meeting to exchange ideas. Every two weeks we 
hold brainstorming sessions….the person with a new idea gets to lead it and develop 
it. We provide resources to the person. Even at the interview stage, we try to recruit 
people who have creative ideas. We are an entrepreneurial company and failures are 
not faulted” 
 
Therefore, through the building of social relationships, not only did Aavishkaar 
investees gain the necessary social capital reserves needed for deploying 
social innovation, they also found new investment opportunities. Priyank, an 
investment manager at Aavishkaar illustrates:  
 
“I have learnt a lot about entrepreneurship through my interaction with companies. I 
have also learnt to interact with customers and learnt a lot about business systems. I 
was the fourth person to join Aavishkar along with the CEO and the Trustee I attended 
quarterly review meeting. This helped me to learnt a lot about risks and investments. I 
figured out the reasons for challenges. The fifteen promoters (entrepreneurs) that we 
have invested in from arrange of sectors are part of my network. I have also 
established networks with the MF (Micro Financial Industry).  
 
4.3 Accessing Financial Capital Within a Backdrop of Financial Exclusion 
 
Case data analysis shows that Aavishkaar and its three-investee social 
enterprises encountered seemingly insurmountable difficulties in accessing 
financial capital. This may have been due to the nascency of financial capital 
markets in India during the decade leading up to 2010. It is worth noting that 
though Aavishkaar was based in Mumbai-the financial capital of India, Vineet 
faced challenges in raising finance as he recalls:    
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“There were several barriers. There was no ecosystem in rural India that could support 
Aavishkaar, we had to educate the entrepreneur about the benefits of venture capital. 
At that time, the concept of venture capital in India was still emerging. Moreover, we 
were targeting a new segment, the rural VC that was an untapped market both in India 
and the world”.  
 
He further elaborates how these barriers translated into financial constraints: 
    
“In 2002, we registered the Aavishkaar India micro-venture fund with SEBI. We also 
set up a Singapore Arm, to raise funds from socially conscious investors who were 
looking to make a difference in India. We started with only $200,000 instead of the 
estimated $2 million needed for a profitable business model. This meant that our staff 
was overburdened and under-funded investments slowed our growth”   
 
The massive shortfall in funds created bottlenecks during the developmental 
phase of Aavishkaar. Its founders and senior management adopted financial 
prudence and frugal practices to overcome limitations imposed by limited 
funds. Such meticulous financial management practices were apparent in this 
extract from an interview with Prashant, an investment manager at Aavishkaar:  
         
“Running operations with a small amount of capital made us develop a more 
disciplined approach to investments with rigorous due diligence and strong investee 
accountability”  
 
The three-investee social enterprises funded by Aavishkaar also reported 
financial constraints across geographies. SKEPL in the Indian state of Gujarat, 
which was the second investment made by Aavishkaar is a pioneering social 
enterprise that has developed affordable, contextualised, innovative and 
integrated automated dairy systems for dairy cooperatives in India. Ujval its co-
founder reported that lack of access to finance in this quote:  
 
“The initial capital for the company was INR 5 Lakhs invested by the seven co-
founders. We took no loans and reinvested our profits in the enterprise” 
 
In response to probing questions, Ujval elaborated further, how lack of finance created 
further problems as best illustrated in this quote:     
 
“For us the biggest challenge is to find skilled human resources. It is difficult to find 
people who will work with you. We faced a major challenge in recruiting people in the 
rural area who could perform as we wish them to finally be decided to recruit 
unemployed people both graduate and non-graduate and trained them in the field for 
5-6 days and in the office for 1-2 days”.  
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Sumita, the founder of Rangasutra, also expressed the struggles she went 
through in raising finance:      
 
“I felt that there must be a new way of doing things so I decided to set up an enterprise 
in 2004. I then began looking for investors and like-minded people to invest in my 
enterprise. Banks I approached were not interested to fund my idea. Friends and 
family also showed low interest. So, I put in my own money.”  
 
Finally, Sanjay a co-founder in Swas Healthcare that claims to be India’s first 
chain of naturopathy and other alternative medicine based services in smaller 
cities of India detailed his struggles with raising finance:     
 
“We started three years ago in 2006. When we initially approached Aavishkaar, we 
were unsuccessful as our operations were small. We found it difficult to raise finance 
during those years so our growth was slow. Then, later in 2009, Aavishkaar provided 
us with seed capital which turned the business around.”  
  
The recurrent theme of ‘financial exclusion’ across the main and sub-cases of 
social enterprises spans both geographies and time. Lack of formal financial 
institutions created a context quite different from the Western model of DVC. It 
would be reasonable to suggest that Indian government and international 
development agency-led financing programmes failed to address the start-up 
needs of the social enterprises who participated in this research. Researchers 
argue that such programmes lack contextual understanding. Further, their 
motives are patronage under the umbrella of human rights rather than 
empowerment (Waghmore, 2012; De and Berner, 2009).  
 
Thus, the sub-cases examined in this study were driven to success by 
entrepreneurial zeal present within the founders’ stock of human capital; with 
Aavishkaar enabling them with the necessary financial capital and helping 
them create new social capital. Major contributions of the research and their 
implications are discussed next. 
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5.0 Discussion  
 
Aavishkaar’s social innovation – DVC - overcame various obstacles owing to 
the unique combination of ‘capitals’ that it was able to generate, overcoming 
numerous socio-economic hurdles, all within the unique cultural setting of 
India. Findings indicate that, operationally, the phenomenon of DVC in India is 
organized somewhat differently when compared to developed economies. 
Major contributions and such differences are highlighted in the sections below: 
 
5.1 Emergence in a Unique Socio-Economic and Cultural Landscape  
 
Previous researchers have suggested that countries differ significantly with 
regard to location-specific contexts in which they are embedded  (Aslesen & 
Harirchi, 2015). Embeddedness in a developed or emerging country context 
can affect the likelihood of building local and global linkages and accruing other 
locational benefits. Entrepreneurial activities are strongly influenced by the 
context in which they occur and different contexts enable entrepreneurs to 
create opportunities. For instance, rural entrepreneurs mix an intimate 
knowledge of and concern for the place with strategically built non-local 
networks. They seek to exhaust the localized resource base before seeking out 
non-local resources (Korsgaard et al., 2015). Thus, it is important to explore 
how different forms of contexts are bridged in different settings to create 
opportunities. 
 
The embeddedness of this research’s participants in their Indian rural context 
led to the creation of their specific life-worlds, including their linkages, business 
models and scale and scope of provision. Social entrepreneurs took upon the 
challenge of filling gaps in services when top down and centrally planned 
initiatives launched by the Indian government and international development 
agencies failed (Jalali, 2008). Prior to embarking on their entrepreneurial 
journeys, social entrepreneur participants in this research experienced failed 
development initiatives in rural India leading to serious social problems of 
immense scale. They understood the nature of socio-economic and cultural 
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barriers to adoption such as the caste system, institutionalised corruption, 
violence, income inequality and the powerful hold of religious institutions in the 
day to day life of marginalised communities. There was a realisation that social 
systems could be altered by enhancing efficiencies through through ICT 
systems and by engaging beneficiaries as agents in their own empowerment 
process (Datta and Gailey, 2012). Hence, behind the success of DVCs like 
Aavishkaar in India is a serious attempt by social entrepreneurs to take over 
the provision of services usually reserved for state institutions.  
 
Previous researchers have examined unique aspects of the Indian business 
culture and core values such as the importance of family (Banerjee, 2008), the 
adoption of a socially engaged approach than a narrow focus on shareholder 
value (Cappeli et al., 2010; Gulati, 2010), and comfort with ambiguity and 
adaptability that enables entrepreneurial pathways to the micro and small 
business sectors (Borker, 2012). Another, equally important yet understudied 
aspect, is financial frugality and prudence, traits often, though somewhat 
erroneously, associated only with the large Bania caste or the business class 
in India. It was found that financial frugality formed an important corner stone of 
management within Aavishkar and its investee social enterprises. The 
founders practiced it as almost second nature and continued to even when 
their enterprises and social innovations had grown substantially and financial 
sustainability was no longer a pressing problem.  
 
5.2 Alignment of DVC-Investee Social Visions 
 
Prior research has examined integrated features of social movements 
contributing new insights to the theoretical and methodological discussions on 
social entrepreneurship’s ‘social’ aspects. It has been found that social 
movements are strongly inclined towards social transformation, which within an 
organisational context has been referred to as ‘social entrepreneurial 
movements’ (Montessori, 2016). Aavishkaar’s vision, “to catalyze equitable 
development globally by supporting entrepreneurial intervention”, under which 
it provides risk capital support for rural social entrepreneurs can be seen as a 
mechanism to galvanize social entrepreneurial movements. With Aavishkaar’s 
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support, SKEPL developed integrated dairy management systems for Indian 
farmer cooperatives that addressed social concerns around transparency, 
market manipulation and fair pricing; and, Rangasutra provided a platform to 
revive ancient artisan skills to address concerns around the decay of ancient 
Indian artisan skills.  
 
Aavishkaar’s ability to support the development of innovative solutions to 
address social concerns relied on its investment philosophy. The DVC-investee 
relationship was a rich and hands on ‘partnership of equals’. Aavishkaar’s 
mission of supporting social innovations was closely aligned with the missions 
of the investee social enterprises. At Aavishkaar and its three investees, the 
idea for a new venture was developed by founders through regular interaction 
with rural entrepreneurs. Social networks of the founder enabled collective 
action to raise financial capital. Social networks of investees were developed 
through frequent interaction during investment monitoring by the Aavishkaar 
team.  
 
The above require a unique relationship dynamic to exist between Aavishkaar 
and its investees. Research highlighted that achieving this dynamic was not 
particularly difficult due to mutually shared visions, cultural experiences, a deep 
understanding of norms and values of rural and semi-urban India and, very 
importantly, trust. Research suggests that frequent interaction (Gulati, 1995; 
Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and open communication enhances trust (a form of 
social capital), which makes individuals more willing to share knowledge (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994; Uzzi, 1996). In the case of Aavishkaar, trust developed 
as its social objectives and those of its socially conscious overseas Indian 
technocrat investors came into alignment. Between Aavishkaar and its 
investees, trust emerged due to the development of a ‘partnership of equals’ 
where common values and a unique social vision to uplift marginalized 
communities were shared. 
 
In contrast, research conducted on Western DVCs and social enterprises 
suggests that goal congruence between funding institution and the social 
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enterprise is difficult to achieve which has led to numerous failures such as that 
of the franchising model (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). 
 
5.3 Social Bricolage and the Success of Aavishkaar  
 
Given the notion that social entrepreneurship in the developing world differs 
from the developed world (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015), it would be reasonable 
to take on board the idea that the practice of social bricolage may also be 
equally varied. Thus, the significance of recognizing the influence of socially 
embedded informal institutions becomes important, since this allows us to 
consider differences across and within different developing world contexts (Holt 
and Littlewood, 2016). 
 
Bricolage is common within poor communities where entrepreneurs amongst 
them employ diverse and innovative approaches, resorting to bricolage as an 
immediate means of mobilizing resources (Linna, 2013).  Bricolage, as applied 
to entrepreneurship in the developing world, and social enterprises more 
specifically, is particularly applicable (Holt and Littlewood, 2016), and its 
evidence appears strongly in the case of Aavishkaar.  
 
Aavishkaar’s social innovation – DVC - developed under severe financial 
constraints. This meant that the founder, drawing on cultural roots and 
institutionalized norms, had to develop the venture through the creative re-
combination of meagre resources in-hand. Aavishkar, like other entrepreneurial 
bricoleurs (Baker, 2007), refused to accept limits imposed by lack of resources. 
Resource constrained small firms are able to create ‘something from nothing’ 
through the exploitation of physical, social or institutional inputs that other firms 
reject or ignore (Baker and Nelson 2005). Within the scheme of bricolage 
categories such as network bricolage, institutional bricolage, collective 
bricolage and social bricolage – the deployment of social bricolage was found 
to be strongest at Aavishkar. Social bricolage demands active stakeholder 
participation and persuasion which is precisely what made Aavishkar’s work 





In this paper, the case of a financial social innovation - a DVC that provides 
equity risk capital to high growth social enterprises within marginalised 
communities in India - was examined. Following an exploratory and interpretive 
approach, new insights were gained into social innovation and social enterprise 
creation within a developing country context. In doing so, the research 
responds to calls by Chell et al. (2010) in the special issue by Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development for further research on social innovation and 
enterprises in different international contexts.   
    
Findings illustrate the manner in which four social entrepreneurs launched 
enterprises after experiencing inefficiencies in development initiatives of the 
Indian government and international development agencies. Their 
understanding of the socio-economic and cultural aspects of India enabled 
them to find innovative and entrepreneurial solutions that challenged existing 
social systems and engaged marginalised communities in their empowerment. 
The financial, human and social constraints and the developed solutions and 
approaches to deal with such constraints were very much born out of the 
extreme environment of doing business in India. 
  
Further research in the area should examine socio-cultural factors in other 
developing countries and attempt to link specific drivers that enable social 
entrepreneurs to enact the social innovation process. For policymakers and 
institutions looking to support social entrepreneurs, evidence from the study 
implies that there is need to develop a deeper understanding of the social and 
cultural drivers within which development initiatives develop.     
 
A limitation of this study is that it focused on a single country - India. However, 
findings can provide the basis for developing general propositions to guide 
future researchers interested in studying drivers of social innovation and 
enterprise emergence in different socio-economic and cultural contexts. 
Another limitation, the purposeful selection of ‘successful’ investments made 
by a single DVC, is also acknowledged. Unfortunately, given the time and 
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resource constraints of the research this was unavoidable. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that such early stage theorisation is generally appropriate to guide 
future research, where findings could be refined and tested empirically using 
novel qualitative approaches or through large sample longitudinal studies using 
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Table 1 Overview of Interviewees 
 
Note: interviewee names as actual  
Interviewee Role Background  No of 
Interviews  
Lindsay  Associate Vice President 
and Editor of Beyond Profit 
magazine at Aavishkaar & 
sister concern Intellecap  
Female, American  
Age: 30-39 
Business Strategist  
 
Decade of international experience in a range of 
advisory, research, forecasting and start up roles in 
intersection between commercial social responsibility 
initiatives and social change    
1 







Vineet  CEO/co-founder of  
Aavishkaar  
Male, Indian,  
Age: 40-49 
Postgraduate Diploma in Forest Management from 
Indian Institute of Forest Management, Bhopal  
   
18 years’ experience in early stage investing and small 
business incubation and microfinance  
2 




Chartered Financial Analyst   
2 
Ujval  Co-founder, SKEPL 
Brand Akashganga 
(One of 7 founders)  
Male, Indian 




Sumita  Founder and Managing 
Director, Rangasutra 
Female, Indian,  
Age: 45-55 
Degree in Economics from Mumbai University. Fulbright 
scholar in the United States, completed a Masters 





Healthcare   
 
Male, Indian 
Age: 40-49 
MBA  
1 
 
 
 
